"The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing." - Socrates
Before we start our usual Macro and Credit musing we would like as a reminder to discuss Wicksell Differential and the credit cycle (linked to the leverage cycle). Wicksell argued in his 1898 book Interest and Prices that the equilibrium of a credit economy could be ascertained by comparing the money rate of interest to the natural rate of interest. This simply equates to comparing the cost of capital with the return on capital. In economies where the natural rate is higher than the money rate, credit growth will drive a positive disequilibrium in an economy. When the natural rate of interest is lower than the money rate which is the case today (rising Libor), the demand for credit dries up (our CCC credit canary are being shut out of credit markets) leading to a negative disequilibrium and capital destruction eventually. In a credit based global macro world like ours, the Wicksellian Differential provides a better alternative estimation of disequilibrium than the more standard Taylor Rule approach of our central bankers. At the Bank for International Settlements since 1987, Claudio Borio and his colleague Philip Lowe wrote in 2002 a very interesting paper entitled “Asset prices, Financial and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus”, BIS Working Papers, n. 114. In this paper the authors made some very important points that are worth reminding ourselves today:
"Widespread financial distress typically arises from the unwinding of financial imbalances that build up disguised by benign economic conditions […] Booms and busts in asset prices […] are just one of a richer set of symptoms […] Other common signs include rapid credit expansion, and, often, above-average capital accumulation" - source BISSo when we hear Janet Yellen at the Fed saying the following:
"Asset values aren’t out of line with historical norms." -Janet Yellen, 21st of September 2016We reminded ourselves that Wicksell used just the housing sector to illustrate his theory. Excess lending dear Mrs Yellen, always lead to "overinvestment". Just because the Taylor Rule used by the Fed doesn't include asset prices, it doesn't mean in our book that asset values are not out of line of historical norms.
Why is the Wicksellian Differential so important when it comes to asset allocation? Either profits increase due to an increase in the return of capital and/or a fall in the cost of capital (buybacks funded by a credit binge). This is clearly reminded by Credit Capital Advisors' note from July 2012 entitled "Navigating the business cycle: A new approach to asset allocation":
"The calculation of the Wicksellian Differential is however an ex-post measure, so is unhelpful for investors to use as an investment trigger, hence an ex-ante model needs to be constructed based on the underlying drivers of growth in the Wicksellian Differential, which is of course leverage. However, an ever-increasing amount of leverage is clearly unsustainable and will cause expectations to shift at some point, resulting in a period of deleveraging and falling profits. As a result, an investment trigger can be set up based on the dynamic relationship between leverage ratios and the rate of profit, which requires constant recalibration as new data is made available.
The relationship between each leverage ratio and the rate of profit is unique and dynamic through time. For example, the slowdown and fall in the consumer leverage ratio caused the Wicksellian Differential to reverse between 1990 and 1992. Furthermore, during the tech bubble between 1996 and 1999, corporate leverage fell followed by consumer leverage, causing the rate of profit to fall. This highlights that there was no real basis for rising equity returns during the tech bubble as the rate of profit growth was falling. Thus the dotcom bubble ought to be seen as akin to John Law’s South Sea bubble, which was purely based on a rather large misconception. The extent of the credit bubble leading up to the recent financial crisis is highlighted by the substantial rise in consumer leverage, the rate of which began falling at the end of 2006, highlighting the downturn in the rate of profit growth in 2007, and thus a shift to bonds. Finally consumer leverage rose again in 2009, signaling a recovery in profits, although the recovery was short-lived. In 2011 the trend fell again, and the 2012 signal highlights a continuing slowdown in the underlying trend of profit growth.
There are of course other factors that impact profits, such as significant changes in the general price level and in output per worker, as well as other known variables such as the tax rate; however, the most important driver with respect to the turning points is the realisation that a period of credit expansion has become unsustainable, leading to changing expectations." - source Credit Capital Advisors, July 2012And of course dear readers, we have long been warning that the credit cycle was slowly but surely turning thanks to credit "overmedication". End of our Wicksellian Differential parenthesis.
In this week's conversation, while credit markets are still strongly technically driven thanks to central bank competing with credit investors, we would like to look at Japan's latest bending the curve experiment as well as rising inflation expectations leading to some pundits asking themselves about the potential return of the much dreaded "stagflation" word.
- Macro and Credit - Can the Bank of Japan bend the yield curve?
- Macro and Credit - Is reflation around the corner and leading to stagflation?
- Final chart: Balance sheets are out of sync with the economy
- Macro and Credit - Can the Bank of Japan bend the yield curve?
"BoJ switches policy target from quantity to interest rates; what about prices?
At its September Monetary Policy Meeting (MPM), the BoJ carried out its comprehensive assessment and introduced QQE with yield curve control. The new policy consists of: (1) yield curve control, by which the BoJ will manipulate short- and long-term yields; and (2) an overshoot commitment, whereby the BoJ pledges to keep expanding the monetary base until CPI inflation exceeds and stays stably above 2% YoY. The sustainability of huge JGB purchase operations totaling ¥80tn annually caused some concern, and the risk that yields would decline without limit prompted the BoJ to switch its target from quantity to interest rates and thereby make purchase operations more flexible. On the price side, we see some evidence that inflation is trending downward again, such as the core CPI’s dip into year-on-year negative territory (Chart of the day).
The BoJ’s strengthened commitment to 2% inflation runs the risk of postponing the exit from monetary easing until even further in the future. In this note, we consider the BoJ’s new monetary policy, including the extent to which it can contribute to raising prices.
Yield curve control – the balancing act
The BoJ’s “yield curve control” means that a rate of -0.1% will be applied as the short-term rate to policy-rate balances in current accounts held at the BoJ. For the long-term rate, the BoJ will conduct long-term JGB purchase operations in such a way that the 10yr yield stays at about 0%. At the same time, the BoJ aims to maintain the pace of annual JGB purchase operations at the current ¥80tn while guiding interest rates, so doubts remain about the simultaneous use of yield curve control and quantity. The BoJ maintains that yield curve control is at the center of its new framework.
Indeed, as the 10yr yield approached -0.1%, the BoJ reduced purchase operations on 30 September. This reminded market participants that -0.1% was the yield’s lower limit. The purchasing cutback was small, but in light of the possibility that operations could be reduced again, the 10yr JGB will probably be seen as difficult to buy the next time its yield approaches -0.1%. Given the small size of the purchasing cutback, it might appear that tight supply-demand is likely to push the yield below -0.1% again, but the BoJ first indicated that the target yield level was 0% and then showed its intention by reducing purchase operations. If the 10yr yield approaches -0.1% again, market participants will likely start to expect another purchasing cutback. The BoJ has declared that it will control short- and long-term rates, so with the short-term rate set at -0.1%, it is difficult to envision the BoJ doing nothing if the 10yr yield sinks below that level. Therefore, the BoJ might be able to keep the 10yr yield at about 0% without reducing purchase operations very much.
The BoJ’s Summary of Opinions at the Monetary Policy Meeting (20-21 September), released on 30 September, says: “It is uncertain whether the pace of JGB purchases will slow down as intended and the sustainability of monetary easing consequently improve under yield curve control.” The goal of slowing JGB purchases is clearly mentioned, and the BoJ’s stance on “quantity” and “policy sustainability” does not appear to be settled. The BoJ is probably wary of reducing quantity only to see the yen strengthen or stocks weaken. Nevertheless, we believe it will gradually move in the direction of reducing quantity.
In any case, it would be difficult to hold the 10yr JGB yield down to 0% without purchase operations, but the BoJ itself will have to continue searching for the right amount of purchases to do the job. Even if the BoJ shifts entirely to an interest rate target, there is no guarantee that it can control the yield curve, so uncertainty would be high. The important point is how fast the BoJ can shift to an interest rate target. The BoJ for now seems to be targeting the shape of the yield curve at the time of the September MPM, so yield targets are 0% for the 10yr yield, 0.4% for the 20yr yield and 0.5% for the 30yr yield (Rates forecast: Attention on BoJ operations when yields decline).
Reflation credibility of the new framework
History shows that when prices and the economy overheat, rate hikes can be deployed to exert some control. But is it possible at normal times, in the absence of a financial or liquidity crisis, to boost prices by making monetary policy more accommodative? At this point in Japan, the effort is not going very well. In general, QE by purchasing T-Bills with 0% interest rates is not thought to be effective. Because highly liquid T-Bills with 0% interest rates have about the same value as cash, and exchanging one for the other has almost no economic effect. On the other hand, expanding the monetary base by purchasing long-term JGBs has a strong experimental aspect. Although long-term JGBs have low yields and high liquidity, they are not equivalent to cash. The BoJ introduced QQE in April 2013, and the yen’s sharp depreciation and rise of prices made the policy look effective. After three and a half years, however, inflation is heading downward again, while there was some impact from the decline in oil prices.
Since the beginning of the Abe administration at end-2012, it is true that the yen has weakened owing to a certain sense of inflation expectation. Another factor behind the yen’s depreciation is that the then Federal Reserve Board (FRB) Chairman Ben Bernanke mentioned tapering in May 2013, and tapering began in December of that year. From then until rate hikes actually began in December 2015, the US appeared to approve of some USD appreciation. In 2008 and later, amid the financial crisis that stemmed from the US subprime loan crisis and the Greek debt crisis, the FRB and the European Central Bank (ECB) implemented a variety of operations, including asset purchases. Their contribution to reducing risk premiums, raising asset prices and stabilizing the financial system helped to raise expectations of the BoJ’s QQE.
Immediately after QQE was deployed, prices steadily rose, owing in part to the weak yen effect, but the inflation trend turned downward with the decline of oil prices beginning in summer 2014. This was unfortunate for the BoJ, but even though the year-on-year decline in oil prices has shrunk considerably, inflation remains low (Chart 1).
Even the CPI inflation excluding energy prices is trending lower, suggesting that this may be the effect of the yen’s recent strength. Although the yen’s depreciation from 2013 did help to boost prices, that effect has peaked out because of the yen’s appreciation this year. The forex rate affects prices with a lag of six months to one year, so forex will be a price-lowering factor for the time being (Chart 2).
Based on the results of the September MPM, the possibility of JGB purchasing cutbacks gave rise to concern that the yen would strengthen further. Ironically, or perhaps fortunately, expectations of US rate hikes rose and this may have weakened the yen instead.
In the end, the major determinant of inflation will be the extent to which tighter labor market conditions push up wages. In 2014, when the weak yen and a consumption tax rate hike raised prices, wages did not see a commensurate rise, and as a result, consumption was sluggish. According to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare’s Monthly Labor Survey, total cash earnings (nominal wages) climbed 1.2% YoY in July. However, scheduled cash earnings (basic wages, etc.) rose only 0.3%, while bonuses and other special payments boosted the overall figure. In August, total cash earnings declined 0.1%, their first downturn in three months, but scheduled cash earnings were up 0.5%. If the BoJ is aiming for 2% inflation, wage hikes are still insufficient, but the unemployment rate has declined to about 3% and companies facing labor shortages have started hiring more full-time workers, including permanent employees. Favorable changes like these are starting to be seen in the labor market (Chart 3).
The corporate sector’s retained earnings have hit a record high, while the labor share is declining, so there is plenty of room for improvement (Chart 4).
Price-lowering pressure from the strong yen will continue for a time, but we expect to see modest price rises over the medium to long term. However, is it possible for monetary easing to cause sustained inflation? We cannot give a definite answer, but let us consider this matter by looking back on the BoJ’s monetary policy and its ripple effect.
Effect of quantitative expansion
Under the BoJ’s QQE, asset prices rose strongly starting in 2013. Normally stock and JGB prices have a negative correlation with one another, but at that time they had a positive correlation and rose together (Chart 5).
That relation seems to have broken down since the start of this year, but for at least three years asset prices rose in a way not normally seen. The problem is that rising asset prices were not reflected in general prices. This was likely resulting from the fact that the BoJ expanded the monetary base at a rapid rate, but the expansion of money stock was limited (Chart 6).
To put it another way, even though the monetary base expanded, bank lending increased only slightly. Since 2000, Japan’s monetary environment has been accommodative, and bank deposits have continually increased, but bank lending has not. To cover the deposit-loan gap, domestic banks increased investment in JGBs (Chart 7).
Therefore, even when the banks’ JGB holdings were exchanged for cash under QQE, the lending situation of banks did not greatly change. The asset composition of domestic banks shows that in the three years after QQE started, the share of bank assets in JGBs declined, while the share in cash increased by a similar percentage. Other asset classes did not change much (Chart 8).
Although the absolute amount of lending did increase, it mainly went into real estate-related projects. Lending growth to manufacturers for capital goods was limited. Even though the monetary base expanded, the amount of funds circulating in the real economy (money stock) did not change much, so the kinds of price increases seen in assets were not seen in general prices.
Effect of negative interest rates
At the January 2016 MPM, the BoJ applied a negative interest rate of -0.1% to a portion of current accounts held at the BoJ. It introduced a three-tiered structure for current accounts and other measures to avoid negative impact on banks, which until then had cooperated with QQE. In the JGB market, however, about three years of JGB purchase operations had tightened the supply-demand relationship, causing yields to decline sharply, the yield curve to flatten, and arousing concern about pressure on the earnings of financial institutions (Super long JGB supply-demand balance). In Europe, which introduced negative interest rates before Japan, the side effect of reduced bank margins was conspicuous, but it did not lead to much of an increase in lending to corporations, the intended benefit. With interest rates on deposits remaining positive, loan rates could only be lowered to a certain extent without eating up the margins. In particular, Japan has already experienced a long period of low interest rate policy, and interest rates on loans are already low, so further downside room is limited (Chart 9).
In Japan, with its high ratio of indirect financing, the effect on the real economy is only slight. Moreover Danish banks responded to the decline of bank margins by raising service charges on mortgages and other products. According to a 7 October Nikkei Shimbun article, Japanese banks are also considering higher service charges on mortgages. This will have a de facto monetary tightening effect. However, a low-interest rate environment is generally positive for corporate funding. Amid the limited decline of interest rates on loans, corporate bond issuance is picking up in Europe. In Japan, the corporate bond market did not expand, partly because Japanese companies have large reserves, but issuance did swell this summer (Japan Credit Monthly, September 2016). As the yield curve flattened, issuance increased at maturities over 10yr (Chart 10).
The wider variety of corporate funding alternatives can be described as a benefit, but the BoJ’s monetary policy change might also bring about a change in this trend. As the BoJ points out, the costs and benefits of policies must be watched.
With the April 2013 introduction of QQE, called a monetary “bazooka” at the time, the BoJ tried to work on people’s expectations and raise CPI inflation to 2% within two years, but the attempt failed (Looking back at three years of QQE). In the absence of any clear reason why expansion of the monetary base should lead to a higher inflation rate, the BoJ’s action was even called a social experiment. Monetary policy is a crucial means of stabilizing prices and the financial system. When the economy overheats, for example, it can be treated with a rate hike, and when liquidity dries up in a financial crisis, the central bank can supply liquidity. Although there were a number of different factors that make it difficult to blame the failure solely on the BoJ, it has proven very difficult to raise prices by monetary policy alone in normal times.
Liquidity is already adequate owing to Japan’s extended monetary easing. It is so adequate, in fact, that banks have trouble finding worthwhile investments for their funds. With the supply of even more funds beyond this point, the costs of this policy are starting to become more pronounced than the benefits. In early July, the 20yr JGB yield dipped into negative territory, a sign of low yields overall and a very flat curve. As the cost of funding foreign currency rose, the possibility arose that domestic investors would have nowhere to invest. “The lower the better” is not a phrase that applies to interest rates. Excessive monetary easing by the central bank can inadvertently rob the market of low-risk assets and heighten financial system risk. The G20 finance ministers and central bank governors have also expressed concern about the side effects of prolonged monetary easing and extremely low interest rates environment.
The increasingly easy monetary policy favored by nearly everyone until recently might now gradually change direction on a global basis. In future, a monetary policy that more closely matches the pace of real economy’s growth might be sought, as well as a policy that is more sustainable. On that point, we believe the BoJ’s switch from quantity to an interest rate target is effective, but it will raise new questions, what the appropriate shape of the yield curve is and whether that will lead to inflation." - source Bank of America Merrill LynchThe same pattern in Europe and Japan is happening, namely that the new money flows downhill where the fun is: to the bond market. Bond speculators are having a field day and now credit speculators are joining the party with both hands even in Japan.
From our perspective, there are a couple of points we would like to make relative to Bank of America Merrill Lynch's comments. First of all we believe that the bending of the curve will be ineffective in triggering the much desired inflation the Bank of Japan is seeking given as we indicated before when commenting on the "Japanification of Europe, both Europe and Japan's deflationary headwinds are stemming from poor demographics. In terms of Wicksellian Differential and real estate and Japan, we note with interest that the prognosis for Japanese real estate is some more pain ahead as NIRP is translating into banks trying to recoup some profitability through higher mortgage rates as indicated by Bloomberg in their article from the 13th of October entitled "Tokyo Condo Prices May Fall 20%, Deutsche says":
"The Bank of Japan’s shift to controlling bond yields is driving up mortgage rates, prompting Deutsche Bank AG to predict Tokyo apartment prices may fall 20 percent or more by 2018.
The BOJ’s negative-rate policy was already hurting buyer sentiment, and its move to boost longer-term yields is a double-blow to the industry, according to Yoji Otani, a real estate analyst at Deutsche Bank in Tokyo. The 35-year fixed mortgage rate has climbed for two straight months after touching a record low of 0.9 percent in August, and sales of new condominiums in Tokyo this year have fallen to the lowest since the nation’s property bubble collapse in the early 1990s." - source Bloomberg
"The one positive thing about negative rates was that it lowered borrowing costs, and now that is going to end," said Otani, who expects prices to fall 20 percent to 30 percent by the end of 2018. "The collapse of this silent bubble has begun."
"The BOJ is operating a negative-rate policy but it is trying to push up long-term yields, which totally lacks sense,” he said. “There’s a contradiction." - source Bloomberg
"That is the very difficult situation that lies with "easy policy", there is an easy way in, but no easy way out. So as goes the kite string theory, you can control a kite by pulling its string, but not pushing it. Once you reach the ZLB and implement NIRP on top of QE, it seems to us monetary policies become ineffective." - source Macronomics, April 2016If indeed real estate turns "South" in Japan then banks will have to increase credit provisions which de facto will reduce credit availability and therefore credit impulse and economic growth. On top of that if indeed Japanese households fall into negative equity thanks to their real estate exposure then again, as a textbook Richard Koo explanation, these households will have no other choice but to reduce their spending and borrowing as they try to repair their balance sheet. Yet another potential for Richard Koo's Balance Sheet Recession theory playing out again in Japan we think.
As well as having a contradictory approach, the Bank of Japan has played the NIRP game given it's mostly has we have explained before a currency play, but then again, anchoring the 10 year Japanese Government Bond around the 0% threshold is conditional of USD/JPY evolution. Furthermore, the Bank of Japan is playing a very difficult balancing act. This is clearly indicated by Nomura in their Japan Navigator note number 691 from the 10th of October entitled "Diminishing room for JGB rates to fall further":
"Conditions for 10yr rates to become positive
We believe 10yr yields are unlikely to reach positive levels unless, as mentioned above, the BOJ allows the pace of its JGB purchases to fall further below its target of “about JPY80trn” in annual absorption, in which case the market would determine that the Bank is unlikely to ease further.
Once expectations of further BOJ easing fade, we believe negative 10yr JGB yields would no longer attract short-term long traders, but only purchases from investors looking to buy for holding until maturity. In this case, we believe 10yr rates would trade above levels that are determined by bank deposit rates and deposit insurance premiums. This is not included in our base case for FY16, but we believe this scenario may materialize in H1 FY17, as the BOJ’s JGB purchases would fall more substantially below its target.
If the BOJ continues buying JGBs at the current pace, it would absorb a net JPY75trn in FY16. However, if the current pace continues beyond end-FY16, it would absorb only a net JPY72trn in FY17, in which case the BOJ would have to either abandon its quantitative target or allow greater flexibility (adopting a proviso) from next spring, in our view.
At that point, if the Fed is discussing another hike (following a hike in December), we would expect the risk of a strong JPY to have declined, but otherwise the BOJ could cut rates further to alleviate investor concerns over QQE tapering." - source NomuraIt appears therefore that further reaction from the Bank of Japan is conditional on the Fed's action in December. What is a cause for concern in the footsteps of our previous conversation relating to our US dollar strengthening fears is that if indeed USD funding tightens further, then USD/JPY basis widens even more which means in effect that strong buyers such as lifers will continue their purchase of US bonds without any FX hedging due to the rising cost. This particular point is worth noting and was highlighted by UBS in their recent Global Credit Comment from the 12th of October entitled "What is the consensus view? And where could it be wrong?":
Hedging FX exposure was brought up in a majority of client meetings, as widening basis swaps reduce the relative yield advantage of US credit. We found that clients are largely hedging FX exposure via short-dated swaps (3 months). But interestingly, a rising fraction noted they are no longer hedging as the costs become less economical. In continental Europe, where negative rate pressures are particularly severe, the rotation into anything with yield is driven largely by institutional pressures (rather than fundamental credit assessments). There are simply few other investment alternatives in a market structure where managers must invest incoming flows and coupon/maturity proceeds. A number of investors reported more recent interest in longer-dated US IG – and a majority of investors continue to report holding a long position in EU financials.
Among the bigger themes, UK and European clients were focused on the outlook for central bank policy, political fragmentation in Europe, the foreign demand for global credit, the state of the US credit cycle3 and US election outcomes. On risks ahead clients were quick to cite many of the known unknowns ahead: Brexit, the Italian Referendum, the December FOMC meeting and other core European elections next year. Based on our discussions, we believe the larger and more underpriced risk scenarios for European credit investors would include: 1) timing and pace of ECB tapering of CSPP, 2) rising systemic risks stemming from idiosyncratic stress among European banks, and 3) significant spread widening in US credit spreads. Note that none of these outcomes are our base case." - source UBSWhereas there is indeed some clear sign of global US dollar shortage increasingly indicated by widening basis swaps, the yield differential still favor having US credit exposure, even long dated to Investment Grade as we feel more and more incline to look for quality rather than chasing yield in US High Yield given the late stage of the current credit cycle and significant build up in leverage with week CAPEX, poor EBITDA and rising defaults. The next US Senior Loan Office Surveys (SLOs) will be paramount for the technical bid in credit and in particular US High Yield to continue we think.
For our second point, we would like to steer towards reflationary expectations and the much commented fears of a return of "stagflation".
- Macro and Credit - Is reflation around the corner and leading to stagflation?
Back in March 2016 in our conversation "Unobtainium" we pointed out that the time that US TIPS were more compelling than UK linkers thanks to their deflation floor, but given the very significant performance of UK linkers thanks to Brexit and the British pound de facto devaluation, we should have noted what the UK linkers market was telling us at the time, namely that further depreciation of the British pound was coming hence the rise of inflationary expectations and the significant performance of this asset class in particular during the month of August.
Our renewed interest in rising expectations can be tracked down from our comments from our March 2016 conversation:
"A very interesting 2015 paper by the Bank of Israel ( (Sussman, N and O Zohar 2015, “Oil prices, inflation expectations, and monetary policy”, Bank of Israel DP092015.) indicates that since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, a 10% change in oil prices moves 5Y5Y expected inflation by nearly 0.1% in the US and 0.05% in the Euro area. Therefore, given the recent significant surge in oil prices towards the $40 mark, we do not think it is such a surprise to see a rise in inflation expectations in that context. This latest rise in inflation expectations could after all be transitory as well as the sudden rise in oil prices, particularly in the light of the tight relationship between the US dollar and oil prices. We think that the latest dovish stance of the Fed all has to do with their concerns relating to the "velocity" of the US dollar and the "unintended consequences" a too rapid rise of the "Greenback" could have on Emerging Markets (EM)." - source Macronomics, March 2016Many pundits have noticed the current reflationary trend particularly in the 10 year breakeven rate in the US over the past couple of weeks. This trend is as well highlighted in Bank of America Merrill Lynch's Securitization Weekly Overview entitled "Reflation takes flight" from the 7th of October:
"This week, we take note of the steady rise in the 10yr breakeven rate over the past few weeks, moving from 1.50% on September 20 to 1.66% as of Friday (October 6) morning, post-September payrolls. Using our breakeven inflation rate valuation framework, we consider what a 2% breakeven rate might mean for securitized products and competing sectors. We choose 2% since we think it is a reasonable target level to assume: in other words, although the Fed downplays the importance of market-based inflation expectations, we think it is likely an implicit target anyway.
Chart 1 and Chart 2 show two different longer term views of the 10yr breakeven inflation rate. We think they both tell us that the recent rise in the breakeven rate is very important and that the chances of continuing to move higher, possibly reaching 2% over the next 3-6 months, are good. At long last, central bank reflationary policies might actually be working.
Chart 1 shows that the recent rise in the breakeven rate has pushed the level through the upper end of the downward trend channel that has persisted since taper talk in 2013. Chart 2, which looks at 30-, 40-, and 50-week moving averages along with the weekly level, suggests that, in recent weeks, the trend may finally have shifted from downward to upward. The weekly reading has crossed through all the moving averages to the upside, and for now, the 30-week moving average is moving higher.
We’re as skeptical about the inflation risk as most, but the view in these charts tells us that, finally, the tide may have shifted in recent weeks towards higher inflation expectations. We’ll consider our breakeven valuation framework in a moment but first we consider what rising inflation expectations means for Fed rate hike potential.
Chart 3 compares the 10yr breakeven rate with the probability that there is at least one rate hike by December 2016; the probability currently stands at 64%.
In recent months, they have moved in similar directions, although not always at the exact same time. Over the past month, since September 2, the 10yr breakeven rate has risen by roughly 16 basis points, from 1.48% to 1.64%. If the same increase applies over the next two months, bringing the breakeven inflation rate to 1.96%, we are confident the Fed would have hiked at least once by the December meeting (as BofAML economists expect); moreover, based on Chart 3, it also seems possible that the market probability of such a hike would be approaching 100%. In other words, the Fed would have reached a perfect position to hike: the market is fully expecting it, and would not react adversely to the hike.
It should be recognized that there is a chicken-and-egg situation here: if the rate hike probability jumped quickly to 100%, say over a day, the breakeven inflation rate would likely quickly reverse the recent rising trend; but if both gradually move higher, in line with the Fed’s gradualist approach, reaching the end state on both the rate hike and the inflation expectation becomes more achievable. The recent breakeven trend reversal to the upside, seen in Chart 1 and Chart 2, makes us believe the latter scenario is the higher probability scenario." - source Bank of America Merrill LynchThe trajectory for inflation expectations and rising 10 year US breakevens in our book is clearly being driven by the change in oil prices, that simple. We have yet to meaningful wage inflation which would entice us to validate the recovery mantra of some sell-side pundits. Nonetheless wages are a backward looking indicator of inflation pressure.
Whereas the rise in US inflation has put indeed some pressure relative to the US yield curve, in effect pushing the US 10 year towards 1.80 % yield level, we do not have such a sanguine approach for the long end looking at the recent downward revision by the Atlanta Fed from their GDPNow latest forecast for 1.9 % on October 14th for the Third Quarter. We therefore believe we are once again approaching compelling levels for US long dated treasury and we will be monitoring the situation closely. As a reminder, when it comes to our contrarian stance in relation to our "long duration" fondness it is fairly simple to explain:
"Government bonds are always correlated to nominal GDP growth, regardless if you look at it using "old GDP data" or "new GDP data." So, if indeed GDP growth will continue to lag, then you should not expect yields to rise anytime soon making our US long bonds exposure still compelling regardless of what some sell-side pundits are telling you."
- Final chart: Balance sheets are out of sync with the economy
"Balance sheets are out of sync with the economy
As we have argued (see: Monthly HG Market Review: June ’16: Brexit and the decline in yields 01 July 2016 ). due to unprecedented monetary policy easing globally, in response to the challenges emerging from and financial crisis and sovereign crises, corporate balance sheets are at a much later stage in the cycle (Figure 17).
This disconnect between the economic cycle and corporate balance sheets is highly unusual and perhaps never seen before. But these times are indeed highly unusual. As the economy moves through the last half of its cycle we thus expect that corporate balance sheets improve a bit over the coming years - although companies are not going to undergo a traditional deleveraging cycle. Then when the economy eventually goes into recession we should see the traditional spike in corporate leverage ratios driven by declining earnings." - source Bank of America Merrill LynchSo dear Janet Yellen, if you think that asset values aren’t out of line with historical norms, balance sheets are and you can expect down the line "Extraordinary Dislocation" and very low recovery rates in the next downturn thanks to Wicksellian Differential rest assured.
"I believe in social dislocation and creative trouble." - Bayard Rustin, American leader in social movements for civil rights, socialismStay tuned !